This paper investigates the effect of political patronage on firms' capital structure. The evidence is from Malaysia, a country characterised by relationship-capitalism, and covers 1988 to 2009. Using a system GMM estimator we find firms set leverage targets and adjust towards them following deviations at the rate of 28% per annum. Next, we construct a natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences model to investigate if the strategic financing decisions of politically patronised firms differ from non-connected firms after an exogenous shock caused by the 1997 Asian crisis. Our results unambiguously demonstrate a significant difference in the capital structure of patronised firms relative to non-connected firms following the exogenous shock but only for the crisis period 1998–2001. After 2002 the capital structures of patronised and non-connected firms are statistically equivalent.

We reconfirm the presence of value premium in emerging markets. Using the Brazil-Turkey-India-China (BTIC) grouping during a period of substantial economic growth and stock market development, we attribute the premium to the investment patterns of glamour firms. We conjecture based on empirical evidence that glamour firms hoard cash, which delays undertaking of growth options, especially in poor economic conditions. Whilst this helps to mitigate business risk, it lowers market valuations and drives down expected returns. Our evidence supports arguments that the value premium is explained by economic fundamentals rather than a risk factor that is common to all firms.