This paper investigates the effect of political patronage on firms' capital structure. The evidence is from Malaysia, a country characterised by relationship-capitalism, and covers 1988 to 2009. Using a system GMM estimator we find firms set leverage targets and adjust towards them following deviations at the rate of 28% per annum. Next, we construct a natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences model to investigate if the strategic financing decisions of politically patronised firms differ from non-connected firms after an exogenous shock caused by the 1997 Asian crisis. Our results unambiguously demonstrate a significant difference in the capital structure of patronised firms relative to non-connected firms following the exogenous shock but only for the crisis period 1998–2001. After 2002 the capital structures of patronised and non-connected firms are statistically equivalent.

Islamic finance as a field of research continues to be exciting and has been evolving with coverage that goes beyond mere comparison with conventional finance. With rapid development in Islamic banking to reach the status of being systematically important in many jurisdictions, the following questions seem pertinent: Should Islamic banking diversify to non-intermediation activities such that it can rival and become a truly alternative to conventional banking in the provision of banking services? How should Islamic banks structure their financing? And what are the financial and real impacts of Islamic banking? As for the Islamic stock markets, in light of on-going research and still inconclusive findings, investment opportunities provided by Shari'ah compliant stocks remain a central issue. The question is: what is the role of Islamic stocks in investment strategies especially from the lens of price discovery? Apart from these traditionally-focused Islamic finance areas, Islamic finance research starts to emphasize other equivalently important areas, among which include Islamic corporate finance and Islamic microfinance.

We reconfirm the presence of value premium in emerging markets. Using the Brazil-Turkey-India-China (BTIC) grouping during a period of substantial economic growth and stock market development, we attribute the premium to the investment patterns of glamour firms. We conjecture based on empirical evidence that glamour firms hoard cash, which delays undertaking of growth options, especially in poor economic conditions. Whilst this helps to mitigate business risk, it lowers market valuations and drives down expected returns. Our evidence supports arguments that the value premium is explained by economic fundamentals rather than a risk factor that is common to all firms.