This paper reports new findings about differential impacts political events have on share prices of firms connected to government in power compared to firms with no political connections. Political connection has been alleged as valuable in popular press in this mid-income economy studied, so it is worth an investigation. Significant share price increases of 4% or more abnormal returns accrue to connected firms relative to unconnected firms when identical political events occur. The impact is very pronounced during a severe economic crisis, when the stakes were high about an incumbent government being re-elected. Our finding of higher value of politically connected firms is due to the expected value of preferential treatments, preference in project selections and access to state benefits. Thus, share prices of politically connected firms react with greater impacts than non-politically connected firms to announcements of identical political events.

The relationship between ownership structures and company performance has been issue of interest among academics, investors and policy-makers. So far, there are still inconclusive findings that family and state ownership giving positive or negative impact on firm performance. This study employed technical efficiency and Malmquist productivity index to measure firm performance. Period of this study will be conduct from 1992 to 2007. Result of this study revealed that Technical efficiency study in Indonesia showed that state owned enterprises (SOEs) had better performance than family owned enterprises (FOEs) since SOEs' performance increased more stably during research period. Meanwhile Malaysia-based technical efficiency study demonstrated that FOEs samples had lower efficiency level than SOEs, which performed a little enhancement. In term of productivity, Indonesian FOEs had become more productive compare with SOEs during three sub-periods. On the other hand, Malaysian FOEs and SOEs had improved from time to time within the three sub-periods.

This paper investigates the characteristics, performance, and share price reaction of politically connected firms versus a control sample of independent firms in Malaysia. Politically connected firms had higher level of leverage, lower profitability, and lower sales to profitability, and paid lower taxes and lower dividends compared to independent firms. Their share prices increase with the announcement of favorable political events. In terms of performance, the active rent-seeking activities in return for preferential treatment produce comparable performance to independent firms during an economic upturn. However, their performance deteriorates more than independent firms during an economic downturn. The percentage of ownership of government institutions in politically connected firms is also much lower, and these firms use more Tier 1 auditors than the independent firms. Overall, the findings are consistent with expectations and evidence from similar studies in developed and developing economies

Firms are increasingly resorting to private placements in recent years, yet there is no published study of emerging markets. There is a unique opportunity to study this behavior during a severe financial crisis, when firms resorted to private placements to recover financially distressed firms. Our analysis using data over fifteen years shows (a) a significant 2–3% positive share price reaction, affirming asymmetric information effect, (b) a significant volume activity, and (c) the price impact is different across a period of a major financial crisis. If the proceeds from placement are earmarked for investment, share price is negatively (positively) correlated during the crisis (non-crisis) periods. Our finding on regulation is inconsistent with prior reports in developed markets: this is explained by the stricter restrictions on trading of private issues in emerging market. These results provide modest new contributions to the literature on private placements.