Chapter in Book

The question of whether capital markets (and the financial sector) are necessary for economic growth and development appeared to have been settled. However, the recent spate of financial crises and the devastating effect they have had on growth and macroeconomic stability have re-stoked questions; not so much about whether the capital markets are necessary for growth as whether they are playing the role expected of them.

The role of regulation extends beyond ensuring stability and confidence in the financial system, as it is also behavioral shaper of market players. The laws, standards, and guidelines issued are instrumental in creating an incentive structure for market players to behave in certain ways. Using incentive audit approach, this paper attempts to examine the efficacy of the evolving Malaysian regulatory and supervisory framework for Islamic banking, in preserving financial stability as well as supporting the growth of the financial system and real economy. The findings suggest that the present framework unintentionally misaligns incentives and discourages Islamic banks from fully embracing risk sharing as the underlying principle for their financial instruments.

Increasing inequalities is one of the defining social, economic, and political challenges of the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) era. Apart from the negative social, public finance, and short-run growth effects of high inequality, the compelling evidence indicates that inequality is an important cause for the financial crises (Kumhof, Ranciere, and Winant 2015; Rajan 2010; de Haan and Sturm 2016; Turner 2016) and low long-term economic growth (World Economic Forum 2017; OECD 2015; IMF 2017). The inequality problem and its visible repercussions on economic growth and financial crises have spurred interest in the economics of inequality.