Newspaper Article

Your career uniquely bridges experience across international markets and Bangladesh. How have these dual experiences shaped your understanding of the practical and theoretical challenges involved in developing robust sukuk markets? International experience offers valuable insights into how more mature jurisdictions facilitate sukuk through clearer regulatory frameworks, stronger market infrastructure, and well-defined governance arrangements. However, the realities in emerging markets, such as Bangladesh, are materially different. Regulatory regimes are still evolving, technical capacity among stakeholders remains nascent, and supporting market infrastructure is limited.

On January 14, a Bangladesh Bank (BB) letter announcing a 'haircut' on deposit profits (no profit on deposits) for the five merged Islamic banks for 2024 and 2025 took depositors by surprise. Following widespread reactions, the decision was revised. The profit rate for individual term and scheme deposits has now been set at four percent for those two years, with a provision to adjust any excess profit already distributed against future profit distributions. In support of the previous decision, on January 15, the governor of the central bank had cited the BB�s Shariah Advisory Board (SAB) opinion that no profit can be paid in the event of a loss. He further explained that, as the concerned banks incurred losses during these years, the cancellation of profit is in accordance with Shariah principles and based on the SAB�s recommendations. Later on January 29, he mentioned that, although depositors do not have any entitlement to the profit, it will be provided as ihsan (benevolence) by the government. In addition, he announced that, from January 2026, the profit rate will be fixed at 9.5 percent for deposits with a tenure of more than one year, while deposits with a tenure of less than one year will earn nine percent. Since Shariah compliance is the foundation of Islamic banking, an unclear articulation of this claim and a lack of disclosure regarding Shariah decisions may raise concerns. For instance, the cancellation of already distributed profits and the fixing of profits in mudarabah contracts are contentious issues. Without clearly outlining the narrative and parameters of these measures, such decisions may lead to unintended consequences, including setting a precedent for Islamic banks to retrospectively revise their profits based on claims of Shariah compliance, thereby increasing depositors� risks. At the outset, it is worth noting that the Islamic banking system in Bangladesh has accumulated various weaknesses over time. Alongside forced takeovers and large-scale irregularities across several banks, persistent deficiencies in product structuring, governance, Shariah compliance mechanisms, and disclosure practices have been evident in many instances. Significant gaps are also apparent in the regulatory and supervisory framework, and laws and regulations generally do not distinguish between interest-based and Islamic banking. The cumulative effect of these shortcomings has created deep structural vulnerabilities in the sector.

While Islamic banking's significant market share and systemic importance within the banking system are often highlighted as notable achievements, a troubling reality undermines this success: a substantial portion of investments in several Islamic banks are non-performing. To contain systemic risks and avoid destabilising the banking system, the central bank has merged five of the 10 full-fledged Islamic banks into the state-backed Sammilito Islami Bank. With a large volume of non-performing investments (NPIs), the Islamic banking sector's urgent priorities include asset recovery, liquidity management, and restoring confidence.